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Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English




In practice, collusive bidders’ rings in English auctions with a single object frequently dis-
tribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The
present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each
bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the
object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the
viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core,
two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present
paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.
KEYWORDS: bidding rings, knockout, core, Shapley value, nucleolus
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1 Introduction
A bidding ring is a group of collusive members who secretly agree not to com-
pete against one another at an auction. Bidding rings have been operated
throughout the world. For example, Cassady (1967) reported bidding rings
in many commodity elds, such as antique trading, sh trading, and tim-
ber rights. Bidding rings reduce or eliminate buyer competition at auctions,
thereby securing an advantage over the sellers.
Cassady (1967) explained that a bidding ring allocates an object won at
auction and divides collusive gains via a re-auction. This re-auction is called
a knockout.1 A knockout is an oral ascending bid auction called an English
auction among the ring members. When bidders have di¤erent evaluations for
the object being auctioned, a sequence of knockouts is produced. In practice,
some sequences of knockouts have been observed. For example, Cassady (1967)
reported the sequence in an antique trade, and Deltas (2002) described the
sequence in an auction of used commercial equipment (case of U.S. v. Seville
Industrial Machinery Corp.).
The purpose of the present study is to develop a cooperative game theo-
retic framework in order to analyze the distributive function of sequences of
knockouts. In the present framework, we can deal with the following prob-
lems. Why would a ring decide to distribute the gains by means of sequences
of knockouts? What, if any, are the advantages to sequences of knockouts?
Economists have paid very little attention to these problems.
The motivation for the present study stems from the fact that most of
the US Department of Justices bid-rigging convictions are a result of whistle-
blowers who are dissatised with their distributive outcomes, e.g., McAfee
and McMillan (1992) and Milgrom (2004). This fact demonstrates that the
distribution of gains from collusion among ring members is a serious problem
that must be overcome by bidding rings. Therefore, it is important to reveal
whether sequential knockouts yield satisfactory outcomes for ring members.
Toward the purpose of the present study, a generic model of sequences of
knockouts with a single object is introduced. This model is applied to a bidding
ring game, which is a coalitional game with transferable utility. Bidding ring
games deal with sharing problems of gains obtained through collusion.
1According to Websters Third New International Dictionary, a knockout is an auction
or sale or similar transaction at which a combination (as of bidders) illegitimately forces
out other potential competitors and arranges by prior agreement to have one member of the
combination secure at a set price the thing being o¤ered so as later to protably dispose of
the thing (as by reauctioning).
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ing that each sequence yields an element of the core; and one sequence yields
the Shapley value while another sequence yields the nucleolus. Each solution
represents a satisfactory outcome for ring members, and hence a ring would
decide to distribute the gains by means of sequences of knockouts. Moreover,
in general, each of the Shapley value and the nucleolus is not yielded by a
single knockout. Ring members would produce sequential knockouts if they
intend toward egalitarianism or minimization of the greatest dissatisfaction of
any bidderscoalition. Thus, the results indicate that sequential knockouts
are advantageous.
In the model of the present study, weak asymmetry of information among
buyers is introduced. Namely, each buyer has information on his evaluation
and the order of the evaluations of all buyers for the object before the main
auction. This situation is more informative than that in the independent
private values model, but this situation requires sequences of knockouts in
order to elicit the evaluations of buyers for the object. The evaluations of
all buyers can be ordered by giving points to each buyer according to (I) the
number of times in the past the buyer has participated in bidding, and (II) the
size of the buyers bid on the occasion of his winning at an auction in the past.
This method for ordering the evaluations of buyers was adopted by bidding
rings in Japan, e.g., McMillan (1991). Using weak asymmetry of information,
a ring formation at each knockout is characterized.
In the literature on knockouts, collusive behavior of bidders in knock-
outs has both non-cooperative and cooperative aspects. Regarding the non-
cooperative aspect of collusive behavior, the bidders strategic behavior has
been analyzed under the independent private values model, e.g., Graham and
Marshall (1987), Graham et al. (1990)2 and Mailath and Zemsky (1991). On
the other hand, there has been little research on the cooperative aspects of
collusive behavior.3 Graham et al. (1990) considered only a single sequen-
tial knockout yielding the Shapley value. The present study provides a generic
model of sequential knockouts including the sequence in Graham et al. (1990).
Therefore, the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus will be emphasized.
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the bidding ring game and cooperative solutions. Section 3 introduces the
model of sequences of knockouts. In addition, this section reports the basic
properties of sequential knockouts concerning the core and the Shapley value.
Section 4 establishes a particular sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.
2Although Graham et al. (1990) used the bidding ring game partially, they considered
primarily the bidders strategic behavior under the independent private values model.
3The game structure of bidding ring games has been investigated, e.g., Oishi (2006) and
van den Brink et al (2007). However, they did not deal with sequences of knockouts.
The present study provides a rationale for sequences of knockouts by show-
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2 Denitions and preliminaries
2.1 Bidding ring games
English auctions are oral auctions in which an auctioneer initially sets a bid
at a low price and then gradually increases the price until only one bidder
remains active.
Assume that there are n buyers in a single object English auction. Let
v1 > v2 >    > vn > v0  0; where vi is the evaluation of each buyer
i = 1;    ; n for the object and v0 is the reservation price of the only seller for
his object. In addition, we assume that there is no asymmetry of information
among buyers; that is, each buyer has information on the evaluations of all
buyers for the object before the main auction.
A bidding ring game in an English auction is a coalitional game with trans-
ferable utility, namely a TU game dened by Graham et al. (1990).
Let N = f1;    ; ng be the nite set of buyers, and let S  N be a coali-
tion. Consider an English auction with the possibility of a bidding ring among
buyers of the auction under non-asymmetric information. This situation can
be described as the TU game (N; v) satisfying
v(S) =
(
v1  maxj =2S vj if 1 2 S
0 if 1 =2 S; (1)
where maxj =2N vj  v0: Note that v is a characteristic function as a real valued
function on 2N satisfying v(;) = 0: We refer to this game as the bidding ring
game.
The above characteristic function v(S) denotes the net gains that S can
obtain by itself. This function is based on the following. First, under the
English auction rule, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to remain active
until bidding reaches his evaluation. Second, any coalition including buyer 1
can win the auction with the net gains v1  maxj =2S vj by making buyer 1 the
sole bidder in the coalition. Finally, in any coalition that does not include
buyer 1, the coalition does not win the auction, and hence the net gain is 0:
2.2 The core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus
An n-dimensional vector x of the bidding ring game is a payo¤ vector if it
satises
P
i2N xi = v(N): Then, the core of this game is a set of payo¤ vectors
x satisfying the stability conditions
P
i2S xi  v(S) for all S  N: The core
embodies a pattern of coalitional stability of the bidding ring.
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jSj!(n  jSj   1)!
n!
(v(S [ i)  v(S)) for all i 2 N: (2)
As is well known, the Shapley value describes a pattern of egalitarianism. The
goal is to distribute the gains from trade equally.4 For more accounts of the
Shapley value, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
Finally, the nucleolus is dened as the imputation that minimizes the great-
est dissatisfaction of any bidderscoalition in the following sense. A payo¤
vector x is called an imputation if x satises the individual rationality con-
ditions xi  v(fig) for all i 2 N: Let X be the set of all imputations of the
bidding ring game. Obviously, X 6= ;: Given an imputation x 2 X, the excess
of a coalition S with respect to x is dened as the number v(S)  Pi2S xi.
The excess of a coalition S with respect to x is a measure of the dissatisfac-
tion that the coalition S feels when x is proposed. Let e(x) be the (2n   2)-
dimensional vector, the components of which are the excesses of every non-
empty coalition S 6= N with respect to x, arranged in decreasing order. The
nucleolus (N; v) is dened as a set of imputations such that the vector e(x)
is lexicographically minimal over X. The nucleolus (N; v) is never empty and
is a singleton (Schmeidler, 1969).
Remark 1 Since the bidding ring game is convex,5 (i) the core of this game
is nonempty and (ii) the Shapley value and the nucleolus belong to the core.
3 Sequences of knockouts
3.1 The model
Next, the model of sequences of knockouts is described using the notations
in Section 2. At an English auction, bidding rings distribute collusive gains
among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts.
Knockouts elicit buyersevaluations for the object in order to distribute
collusive gains among the buyers. Assume weak asymmetry of information
4The Shapley value (N; v) is dened as the unique value that satises the balanced
contributions property: i(N; v)   i(Nnfjg; v) = j(N; v)   j(Nnfig; v) whenever i 2
N and j 2 N . The balanced contributions property states that what player i gets out of
the presence of player j is the same as what player j gets out of the presence of player i.
See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
5See Graham et al. (1990)
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among n buyers. Then, each buyer has information on his evaluation and the
order of the evaluations of all buyers for the object, namely 1  2      n,
before the main auction. A relation i  j for i; j 2 N and i 6= j means
that the evaluation of buyer i is higher than that of buyer j: The auctioneers
of the main auction and knockouts have no information concerning buyers
evaluations. The reservation price v0 is publicly announced to n buyers.
There exists the possibility of a bidding ring, which consists of n buyers, in
the main auction. This is because, under the English auction rule, the gains
of collusive behavior strictly dominate those of non-cooperative behavior.6
Assume that n buyers form an initial ring R0 = N: In the main auction, (i)
buyer 1 remains active in the bidding up to his valuation v1; and (ii) each of
the buyers except for buyer 1 remains active in the bidding up to v0 or does not
participate. The goal of the operation of R0 is to eliminate competition among
the members ofR0: This competitive elimination implies thatR0 can guarantee
the maximal gains of R0. The bidders other than buyer 1 are phantom bidders
in this auction. Buyer 1 wins the main auction and pays v0 to the seller. Since
buyer 1 is the representative of R0; R0 gains ownership of the object won at
the auction.
After the main auction, a sequence of knockouts is produced. The sequence
of knockouts has two key points. First, the size of a ring at each knockout
shrinks consecutively. Second, at each knockout a recursive process on distri-
bution is used.
We assume a ring center.7 The ring center has two roles, namely, as an
auctioneer of each knockout and as a neutral distributor to the members of
R0. After the nal knockout, the ring center has neither gain nor loss.
The sequence of knockouts is described in detail as follows.
(A) A knockout: Given the j   1th and jth rings, Rj 1 = f1; 2;    ;mj 1g )
Rj = f1; 2;    ;mjg; where mj < mj 1 and m0  n; the jth knockout is a
tuple D
Kj; (v)2Kj ; E
E
: (3)
Note that Kj = f1g [ ~Kj [ (Rj 1nRj); where ~Kj  Rjnf1g: Kj is the set
of participants of the jth knockout, (v)2Kj are the private values of the
participants, and E is the English auction rule in the knockout. Here, let
kj be the number of the participants of the jth knockout, namely kj = jKjj.
6For example, see the introduction in Graham et al (1990).
7A ring center is considered in the literature concerning non-cooperative analysis of
knockouts as well, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987).
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In the jth knockout, (a) the members of Rj appoint buyer 1 to remain
active in the bidding up to his valuation v1; and (b) they appoint each of the
buyers other than buyer 1 to remain active in the bidding up to vmj+1 or not
to participate. The valuation vmj+1 is observable to the members of Rj at
the the jth knockout. The goal of the operation of Rj is the same as that of
the operation of R0. Each member of Rj 1nRj bids competitively at the jth
knockout. Thus, Kj = f1g [ ~Kj [ (Rj 1nRj); where ~Kj  Rjnf1g: Note that
mj 1  mj + 1  kj  mj 1: The lower bound of kj means that the members
of Rj 1 other than Rjnf1g participate in the jth knockout. The upper bound
of kj means that the members of Rj 1 participate in the jth knockout.
It is essential to form a ring by consecutive buyers at each knockout. For
example, N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and R1 = f1; 2g: Buyer 1 wins the rst knockout
and pays v3 to the ring center. Even if buyer 4 joins R1; buyer 1 wins the
knockout and pays v3 to the ring center. In this case, buyer 4 does not have
a role of reducing the payments of buyer 1. If R1 intends to reduce the pay-
ments of buyer 1, R1 will be reformed as R1 = f1; 2; 3g: Thus, R1 consists of
consecutive buyers. Similarly, each ring consists of consecutive buyers at the
other knockouts. Using weak asymmetry of information, ring members at the
jth knockout can form Rj = f1; 2;    ;mjg: Note that buyer mj is the ring
member whose private value is the lowest in Rj:
(B) A sequence of knockouts: A sequence of knockouts is given byD





j=0 such that Rt = f1g : (4)
It is possible for the knockouts to continue in the manner stated in (A) for
j = 1; 2;    ; t such that Rt = f1g: In the nal knockout, buyer 1 is determined
as the nal owner of the object. In addition, the distributive outcome of the
members of R0 is determined.
(C) Distributive process: If an arbitrary sequence of knockouts is xed, the
distributive outcome of the sequence of knockouts is dened as follows:
Denition 1 Let (zi)i2N be a distributive outcome of the sequence of knock-
outs. Let Rj = f1; 2;    ;mjg; where mj < mj 1; and let the number of par-
ticipants of the jth knockout be given by kj; where mj 1   mj + 1  kj 
mj 1: Given N = R0 ) R1 )    ) Rt = f1g and (kj)tj=1 ; where kt =
mt 1; zi is dened inductively by z1 = v1   v2 + zt and
zi =




for mj + 1  i  mj 1; (5)
6
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 15
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art15
beginning with m0  n;
Pn
l=m0+1
zl  0 and continuing for j = 1;    ; t:
The underlying scenario of Denition 1 is as follows. Consider an arbitrar-
ily xed jth knockout. Buyer 1 wins the jth knockout and pays vmj+1 to the
ring center. Since buyer 1 is the representative of Rj; Rj gains ownership of
the object. As a result of the jth knockout, the ring center has the surplus
vmj+1  v0 
Pn
l=mj 1+1 zl: The ring center divides this surplus among the par-
ticipants of the jth knockout equally and then disburses this equal distribution
to the members of Rj 1nRj: Each member of Rj 1nRj receives the above equal
distribution zi for mj +1  i  mj 1 and leaves the ring. It is possible for the
knockouts to continue the above distributive behavior for j = 1; 2;    ; t such
that Rt = f1g:
The following remark illustrates money transfer among the ring members
and the ring center.









K2 = R1; (v)2K2 ; E

given
R0 = f1; 2; 3g; R1 = f1; 2g; and R2 = f1g:
Step 1: Before the rst knockout, R0 exchanges a single object for $10 via
the ring center, and the ring center has a debt of $10. Here, R0 gives $10 to
buyer 1 in compensation for buyer 1s payment in the main auction. In the
rst knockout, buyer 1 wins and pays $70 to the ring center. The ring center
receives the surplus $60 because $70 $10. The ring center pays $60=3 (= $20)
only to buyer 3. The ring center then has $40.
Step 2: Before the second knockout, R1 exchanges the object for $70 via the
ring center. The ring center has a debt of $30 (= $70  $40). R1 gives $70 to
buyer 1 in compensation for buyer 1s payment in the rst knockout. In the
second knockout, buyer 1 wins and pays $90 to the ring center. Thus, buyer
1 gains nal ownership of the object and obtains a net gain of $120   $90 =
$30. The ring center obtains the surplus $60 (= $90   $30). The ring center
pays $60=2 (= $30) only to buyer 2. Finally, the ring center distributes the
remaining $30 to buyer 1. Thus, the distributive outcome of this sequence is
($60; $30; $20).
3.2 Basic properties of sequential knockouts
Next, the basic properties of the sequences of knockouts are stated. Each
sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core. In addition, a particular
sequence yields the Shapley value.
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Proposition 1 Each distributive outcome of the sequential knockouts belongs
to the core.
Proof. Let z 2 Rn be the distributive outcome of the sequential knock-
outs. By Denition 1, z is a payo¤ vector. If 1 =2 S; then Pi2S zi > 0 =
v(S): If 1 2 S; it is su¢ cient to show Pi2S zi  v(S) such that S = Rj(=
f1;    ;mjg); because zi > 0:
By Denition 1, we haveX
i2S
















which completes the proof.
Proposition 2 Let the -sequence of knockouts be given by
D
Kj; (v)2Kj ; E
En 1
j=1
satisfying Rj = f1; 2;    ; n jg andKj = Rj 1 consecutively for j = 1; 2;    ; n 
1: Then, the distributive outcome of the -sequence of knockouts is the Shapley
value.
Proof. By calculation, we nd that the outcome of the -sequence is the same
as Theorem 2 in Graham et al. (1990).
4 A sequence of knockouts yielding the nucle-
olus
In the above propositions, the distributive outcomes of the sequential knock-
outs under weak asymmetric information are characterized by cooperative
game solutions under non-asymmetric information. In this section, the same
statement can be made for the case of the nucleolus.
At the jth knockout, the value of the distribution of the ring center is given
by formula (5). Consider the situation in which the value of formula (5) is
minimal with respect to jRjj, given Kj = f1g [ (Rj 1nRj) consecutively for
j = 1; 2;    ; t; such that Rt = 1. Note that at the jth knockout the value of
the formula (5) depends only on jRjj ; given (Rl)j 1l=0 andKj = f1g[(Rj 1nRj):
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Denition 2 The -sequence of knockouts is
D




fying the condition that the value of the distribution at the jth knockout is mini-
mal with respect to jRjj, given (Rl)j 1l=0 and Kj = f1g[(Rj 1nRj) consecutively
for j = 1; 2;    ; t; such that Rt = 1:
The following proposition gives the distributive outcome of the -sequence.
Each step of the algorithm in this proposition describes the distributive process
at each knockout of the -sequence.
Proposition 3 Let (xi )i2N be a distributive outcome of the -sequence of
knockouts. Let Mi = vi   v0 for each i 2 N: Then, xi is given by xi = t and
x1 = v1   v2 + t0 for mt 1   kt + 2  i  mt 1 and 1  t  t0 such that


















where kt denotes the largest value of k for which the above expression attains
its minimum, and mt = m

t 1   kt + 1 (beginning with m0  n; 0  0 and
continuing for t = 1;    ; t0; such that mt0 = 1).
Proof. The proof will be completed by the following two steps.








Each member of R0nR1 receives 1 as his distributive outcome. Take k1 as a
k giving 1. Let R1 = f1;    ;m1g: Then, m1 = n  k1 + 1:








Each member of R1nR2 receives 2 as his distributive outcome. Take k2 as a k
giving 2. Let R2 = f1;    ;m2g: Then, m2 = m1 k2+1: Similarly, the same
procedure can be repeated until the distributive outcome of each member of
R0 is determined.
9
Oishi: Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Step 2 : Next, it is shown that, at the ith knockout, we can take ki = ki ; such
that ki is the largest k giving 

i consecutively for i = 1; 2;    ; t such that
Rt = 1:
8








: Take kq as a k giving 1 in the rst knockout. Let
s1 = 

















k00 = k + kq   1: It is su¢ cient to show (i) and (ii) for the purpose of Step 2






kp   kq + 1
=
Mn kp+2   Mn kp+2kp (kq   1)







kp   kq + 1 =
kp   kq + 1
kp
 Mn kp+2





which completes the proof of (i).
Proof of (ii): For any k = 2;    ;m1; it will be proven that k00 (Mm1 k+2   s1) 
k Mn k00+2  0: By calculation, we have
k00 (Mm1 k+2   s1)  k Mn k00+2
= (k + kq   1)
 
Mn kq+1 k+2   1 (kq   1)
  k Mn (k+kq 1)+2
= (kq   1)Mn kq k+3   (k + kq   1)1 (kq   1)
= (kq   1)(k + kq   1)

Mn kq k+3











8This implies that the distributive outcome of the -sequence is independent of the
number of knockouts.
10
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 15
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art15
because Mn k00+2
k00  1 from the denition of : This completes the proof of
(ii).
Example 1 A seven-buyers case





































1 = 2 (i = 4; 5; 6; 7)




M3   (k1   1)1
2
;
















2 = 4 (i = 2; 3)
m2 = m

1   k2 + 1 = 1 = mt0
x1 = v1   v2 + t0 = v1   v2 + 2 = 9
The distributive outcome of the -sequence is given by x = (9; 4; 4; 2; 2; 2; 2).
The following proposition is the main result in this section.
Proposition 4 The distributive outcome of the -sequence of knockouts is the
nucleolus.
Proof. Let (xi )i2N be a distributive outcome of the -sequence of knockouts.
Let Mi = vi   v0 for each i 2 N: The outcome of the -sequence is given by
the following alternative formula:
xn = minfMn2 ; Mn 13 ; Mn 24 ;    ; M2n g








;    ; M2 xn
n 1 g




;    ; M2 xn xn 1
n 2 g
... = minf . . . ... g
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This alternative formula follows from Proposition 3.
Let (N; c) be a simple version of a cost sharing game referred to as the
airport game, as proposed by Littlechild (1974), with one aircraft of each
type, namely c(S) = maxi2S Ci for each S  N satisfying c(;) = 0: Note
that Ci is the construction cost of the runway for the aircraft of type i: Let
Ci = Mi for each i 2 N , so that C1 > C2 >    > Cn: Then, the alter-
native formula of the -sequence can be regarded as Sönmezs formula of the
nucleolus of the airport game (N; c) (Sönmez, 1994). Owing to the anti-dual re-
lation introduced by Oishi and Nakayama (2009), the nucleolus of the bidding
ring game (N; v) coincides with that of the airport game (N; c). Therefore,
the alternative formula of the -sequence gives the nucleolus of the bidding
ring game. Thus, the proof is completed.
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